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FILTER WARS: THE FIGHT TO DETERMINE
FILTERING RIGHTS UNDER THE FAMILY
MOVIE ACT AND THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT
Amanda A. Garcia
The development of filtering and streaming technology over the last
twenty years has put in to question the purpose and intent of legislation
meant to encompass those technologies. This Comment considers the exclusive rights of copyright owners in their protected works, and the circumvention of the encryptions placed on DVD and Blu-Ray discs to prevent the unauthorized decryption, filtering, and streaming of those works. This
Comment will weigh the rights of creators of expressive works, such as films
and television shows, against the rights of the purchasers to filter the works.
A new defense to circumvention liability will be raised and rejected by the
Ninth Circuit, and this Comment will conclude by explaining why the rights
of purchasers should come secondary to the rights of copyright owners. Finally, this Comment will clarify why it is essential to the public interest that
filtering and streaming services comply with current interpretations of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Family Movie Act, and will propose alternative solutions to avoid liability under these statutes.



J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2019. The author would like to thank the
members of the Editorial Board of the Entertainment Law Review of Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles for their assistance in publishing this Comment. The author would also like to thank her
parents, Rachel Heredia-Garcia and Gilbert Garcia, for their continued support, guidance, and encouragement throughout the years.
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You no longer have to accept the unacceptable in movies and TV.
Want to skip the nudity in Game of Thrones? Go ahead. Don’t
like the mature language in Stranger Things? Mute it. Want less
blood and gore in Hacksaw Ridge? VidAngel lets you skip and
mute any objectionable content, all in the privacy of your home.1

I. INTRODUCTION
“Star Wars is still Star Wars, even without Princess Leia’s bikini
scene,” said Judge Huritz, who presided over a recent Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals (“Circuit Court”) case that addressed the issue of whether a filtering
service would survive to last another day or have its streaming business permanently enjoined.2 VidAngel, Inc. (“VidAngel”) recently filed suit in a
United States District Court (“District Court”) against four Hollywood studios, seeking a declaration as to each of its lawful services after a series of
losses in Los Angeles federal court.3 This series of lawsuits began when
Disney Enterprises, Inc., Lucasfilm Ltd. LLC, Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation, and Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. (the “Studios”) filed for
an injunction against VidAngel’s “family-friendly” streaming service, which
filtered movies and television shows for objectionable content like sex, violence, language, and nudity over existing streaming services like Amazon,
Netflix, and HBO GO.4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected VidAngel’s fair use and Family Movie Act defenses to copyright infringement and
circumvention liability, and granted the injunction in favor of the Studios.5
1. VIDANGEL, https://www.vidangel.com/ [https://perma.cc/773W-7USH] (“You can skip
or mute content from entire categories, like Language or Violence. You can skip or mute content
from sub-categories, such as profanity, or only the graphic violence portion of the Violence category. You can skip or mute content using individual filters, including specific words, or certain
scenes.”).
2. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 861 (9th Cir. 2017).
3. Ben Winslow, VidAngel Sues Studios, Asking Judge to Declare Its Movie Filtering Methods Legal, FOX 13 (Sept. 2, 2017, 9:52 AM), http://fox13now.com/2017/09/02/vidangel-sues-studios-asking-judge-to-declare-its-movie-filtering-methods-legal/ [https://perma.cc/TT8L-KX4U].
4. Id.; Gene Maddaus, Judge Orders VidAngel to Shut Down, VARIETY (Dec. 12, 2016,
7:15
PM),
http://variety.com/2016/biz/news/vidangel-shut-down-copyright-violation1201940368/ [https://perma.cc/BY3V-B67T].
5. Ben Winslow, Federal Appeals Court Upholds Injunction Against VidAngel’s Streaming Service, FOX 13 (Aug. 24, 2017, 2:48 PM), http://fox13now.com/2017/08/24/federal-appealscourt-upholds-injunction-against-vidangels-streaming-service/ [https://perma.cc/E83J-GKEL].
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VidAngel’s appeal presented two issues of first impression: (1) “whether
the Family Movie Act of 2005 exempt[ed] VidAngel from liability for copyright infringement;” and (2) whether the anti-circumvention provision of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act covered the Studios’ technological
protection measures, which controlled both the access to and the use of the
copyrighted works.6
While VidAngel adamantly maintains that it provides the option of
cleaner content to families in the privacy of their homes, the Circuit Court
ultimately decided that allowing VidAngel’s services to thrive would create
a loophole in existing copyright law and provide no recourse to copyright
owners where infringing copies originated from a lawful source.7 VidAngel
now stands to lose its business in the face of the injunction:
VidAngel has just filed a petition for Chapter 11 protection to
pause the Los Angeles lawsuit in order to reorganize its business
around [a] new streaming model. VidAngel is still up and running
and generating millions in revenue . . . . Chapter 11 is simply a
reorganization and part of our legal and business strategy. Per
federal law, Chapter 11 reorganization automatically pauses our
lawsuit with Disney and the other plaintiffs . . . . VidAngel is not
going away.8
Part II of this Comment provides the legal background from which this
case draws its authority, covering the purpose of copyright law, defenses to
copyright infringement, and unlawful circumvention. Furthermore, Part II
provides examples of relevant case law and legislative interpretation that offers contextual background for the case at hand. Part III provides a summary
of the factual background surrounding the case, delving into the mechanics
of VidAngel’s filtering and streaming service. Part IV covers the procedural
background of the District Court’s decision, and Part V examines the Circuit
Court’s decision. Finally, Part VI analyzes the reasons why VidAngel’s assertions are misinterpretations of what copyright law was created to protect
6. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852.
7. Winslow, supra note 5.
8. Message from the VidAngel CEO Neal Harmon, VIDANGEL, https://blog.vidangel.com/chapter11/ [https://perma.cc/42XR-XUGB] (“VidAngel has filed a petition for relief under
Chapter 11 to pause the Los Angeles litigation in order to reorganize its business around its new
streaming service that works with Netflix, Amazon and HBO (other services coming in the future).”).
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and provides alternatives to its current filtering and streaming service. Part
VI also examines the legislative history behind VidAngel’s arguments and
offers a business model that can be utilized in place of VidAngel’s model.
This Comment concludes by explaining why VidAngel’s service is unlawful,
and why failing to enjoin it would have been a detriment to copyright law
and a burden on all United States copyright owners—from entertainment titans, like the Studios, to the most modest of freelance artists.

II. BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT LAW
A. The Copyright Act: Exclusive Rights and the Fair Use Defense
The United States Copyright Act (the “Copyright Act”) gives copyright
owners the exclusive right to use or authorize others to use their copyrighted
works, including the right to reproduce and publicly perform their copyrighted works.9 In order to constitute a “copy” for purposes of the exclusive
reproduction right under the Copyright Act, an “infringing work must be
fixed in some tangible form, ‘from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.’”10 A “public performance” under the Copyright Act occurs
when someone “transmits or otherwise communicates a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process.”11
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights held by the copyright owner
of a work is considered to be a copyright infringer.12
“Fair use” was enacted under the Copyright Act as an affirmative defense to copyright infringement and provides for various non-infringing uses
of an original work.13 The relevant portion of the statute reads:

9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
10. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d,
869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003,
1009 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2002).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
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[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching [], scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of a copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use[,] the factors to be considered shall include: (1) the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.14
Below is an explanation of the four fair use factors considered when a
court evaluates a new work for potential copyright infringement.

1. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first fair use factor considers “the purpose and character of the use”
and asks whether the new work is transformative in its own right, or whether
it simply supplants the original work.15 Fair use favors new works that are
created for non-commercial purposes, and which give new meaning, message, or expression to the original work.16 The Circuit Court has held that
works are transformative when “the works use copyrighted material for purposes distinct from the purpose of the original material.”17 “Commercial use
of copyrighted material is ‘presumptively an unfair exploitation’” of the exclusive right that belongs solely to the copyright owner of the work.18

14. Id.
15. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 972.
16. Id. at 972–73.
17. Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2003).
18. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
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2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second fair use factor considers “the nature of the copyrighted
work”19 and the “value of the materials used.”20 This factor evaluates the
nature of the work that has been copied, and asks whether it is “creative,
imaginative, or represents an investment of time in anticipation of a financial
return” by the original author.21 This factor examines whether the nature of
the new work is highly creative or expressive, and what the value of the materials used were.22 Taking into consideration that some works are “closer
to the core of intended copyright protection than others,” fair use favors more
original and creative works.23

3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third fair use factor considers the quantity of the original work
taken by the copy, and “the quality and importance of the portion taken.”24
If the new work takes substantially from the original work, it is more difficult
to claim fair use.25 The Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc. stated that the “verbatim copying of ‘a substantial portion of the infringing work’ is a relevant inquiry” for this factor.26 The Court further explained
that “a [new] work composed primarily of an original [work], particularly its
heart, with little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding
use, fulfilling demand for the original [work].”27 Since “[t]he heart of a cop-

19. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
20. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (citing Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
21. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
22. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
23. Id.
24. Id.; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.
25. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
26. Id.; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587.
27. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587–88.
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yrighted work is the portion that is the ‘most likely to be…important in licensing serialization,’”28 copying the “heart” of a copyrighted work weighs
against a fair use determination.29

4. Effect of the Use on the Potential Market for or Value of the
Copyrighted Work
The fourth fair use factor considers “current market harm and ‘whether
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant…would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’
for the original.”30 “The Ninth Circuit has held that when ‘the intended use
is for commercial gain,’ the likelihood of market harm ‘may be presumed.’”31 This factor considers whether the new work will replace or substantially impact the demand for the original work in the market, which
weighs against a finding of fair use.32

B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the “DMCA”) was introduced
in 1999 to address, among other things, the circumvention of copyright protection systems,33 and was “designed to facilitate the robust development
and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and education in the digital age.”34 Known as the anticircumvention provision of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) provides
that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work” protected by the Copyright Act.35 A technological
measure “effectively controls access to a copyrighted work” under the
28. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587.
29. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; see Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587; Passport Video,
349 F.3d at 630; L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1992).
30. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590.
31. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974; Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 531.
32. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999).
34. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1–2 (1998).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
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DMCA if “the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the
application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of
the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.”36 The term “circumvention” refers to the decryption of an encrypted work without the authority of
the copyright owner.37 Section 1201(a)(3)(A) “exempts from circumvention
liability only ‘those whom a copyright owner authorizes to circumvent an
access control measure, not those whom a copyright owner authorizes to access the work.’”38 In other words, the exemption applies only to those who
have the authority to decrypt the encrypted work, such as a valid licensee,
not to those who have the authority to view the work, such as a valid purchaser of a DVD or Blu-ray disc.39 If a movie studio encrypts a DVD “so
that it cannot be copied without special software . . . and an individual uses
his own software to ‘crack’ the encryption and make copies without permission, the studio may pursue the copier both for infringement under the Copyright Act, and separately, for his circumvention of the encryption . . . under
the DMCA.”40

C. The Family Movie Act
The Family Movie Act of 2005 (the “FMA”) was passed in the wake
of litigation against two filtering companies, CleanFlicks, LLC (“CleanFlicks”) and ClearPlay, Inc. (“ClearPlay”).41 The FMA was meant to provide an exemption from copyright infringement, and to allow families to

36. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863 (quoting Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp., L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295, 300 (3d Cir. 2011)).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863 (quoting Murphy, 650 F.3d
at 300).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 864 (quoting Murphy, 650 F.3d
at 300).
41. Brief for the Copyright Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 23, Disney
Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).
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control what they watched in the privacy of their own homes.42 The conditions underlying this exemption are that (1) a service can only provide filtering “by or at the direction of a member of a private household,” (2) the filtering must be “a performance in or transmitted to that household for private
home viewing,” (3) the filtering service must not create a “fixed copy of the
altered version,” and (4) the filtering must be “from an authorized copy of
the work.”43
In Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, multiple film studios and
executives sought an injunction against CleanFlicks for the unauthorized reproduction, filtration, and distribution of their copyrighted works.44 CleanFlicks sold and rented out DVD and VHS copies of films that had been filtered to remove objectionable content like sex, profanity, and violence:45
With this simple technology, a consumer would buy an original
tape or a disk of a movie that had some objectionable content and
give it to [CleanFlicks], or [CleanFlicks] would buy the movie
upon request by the customer. For a small fee, [CleanFlicks’s]
personnel previewed the movie and marked the timing of objectionable content. The original video was then re-recorded on a
new tape or disk while removing objectionable content as seamlessly as possible, by suspending recording for the time of objectionable content, muting the audio input for this time, or replacing
the content with ambient noise. No additional content was ever
added to the final product.46
The Clean Flicks of Colo. court refused to apply the FMA exemption
to CleanFlicks’s service because it made “fixed copies of altered works” and
42. Brief for U.S. Representatives John Hostettler and Spencer Bachus as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 11–12, Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848
(9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2005).
44. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006).
45. Id. at 1237–38; see also Larry Williams, Cleaning Up Hollywood: Sanitized Tapes,
DVDs Have Directors Crying Foul, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 1, 2002), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-10-01/features/0210010145_1_dvds-religious-audience-hollywood-studios
[https://perma.cc/2GAH-63SX].
46. Mark D. Shtilerman, Who Can Clean the Flick?: On Remedies for Infringement of Unused Derivative Works, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 497, 503–04 (2008).
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resold those unauthorized copies.47 The court granted the injunction, and
CleanFlicks’s business was effectively shut down.48
In Huntsman v. Soderbergh, ClearPlay survived an injunction by distinguishing itself from filtering services like CleanFlicks.49 Instead of reselling filtered versions of copyrighted works, ClearPlay offers filtering software that works in conjunction with a consumer’s lawful purchase of a
streaming service or physical disc.50 For a monthly fee, customers can purchase ClearPlay’s software, which cuts objectionable scenes and sounds
from a DVD while a work is playing on a computer.51 ClearPlay also offers
DVD players for purchase that are pre-equipped with this software.52 The

47. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. Cf. Williams, supra note 45 (“‘It is
unconscionable, and unethical, to take someone else’s hard work, alter it and profit from it,’ said
Oscar-winning director Steven Soderbergh, a vice president of [Directors Guild of America],”
equating CleanFlicks’s services to “ripping pages out of a book, leaving the author’s name on it[,]
and then [re-]selling it[.]”).
48. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243–44.
49. Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. CIV.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1–
2 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005); Marius Meland, ClearPlay Cleared in Copyright Suit, LAW360 (Aug.
21, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/3913/clearplay-cleared-in-copyright-suit
[https://perma.cc/N7SJ-4AMQ].
50. See Huntsman, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1–2; see also Meland, supra note 49
(ClearPlay’s website states that it “only releases filtering products that are compliant with copyright
law. Keeping our products legal is one of the reasons we have stayed in business for over 17 years.
ClearPlay pioneered legal filtering of DVDs and Blu-ray, and is now pioneering legal filtering of
streaming movies.”).
51. Williams, supra note 45 (“ClearPlay sells a software program for $9.95 a month that
cuts sounds and scenes from DVDs played on a computer….A ClearPlay-equipped DVD player is
available for $699.88.”); CLEARPLAY, https://amazon.clearplay.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZB9UZ7FM].
52. Williams, supra note 45; see also ClearPlay, supra note 51 (“ClearPlay filtering works
while the movie is playing.”); David Pogue, State of the Art; Add ‘Cut’ and ‘Bleep’ To a DVD’s
Options, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/27/technology/state-ofthe-art-add-cut-and-bleep-to-a-dvd-s-options.html [https://perma.cc/4PUV-BNXS] (“It’s a sleek
black super-thin machine with progressive-scan outputs[.] The machine plays regular, unmodified
commercial DVD’s. It skips objectionable scenes based on software filters created by human editors and stored in its memory. (It does not filter DVD bonus materials, homemade DVD’s or copies
of DVD’s.) The filters for 100 recent movies come installed[;] [y]ou have to pay for access to the
other 500 filters[.] To mask bad language, the player momentarily mutes the soundtrack[;] [t]o filter
out violence, sex and ‘disturbing images,’ [] the player simply skips ahead.”).
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Huntsman court found that this technology was exempt from infringement
under the FMA.53

III. BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. The Studios
The Studios are all in the business of producing and distributing copyrighted motion pictures and television programs (the “works”).54 The Studios invest a considerable amount of effort and resources each year to develop their works, and own the exclusive rights within the United States to
reproduce and publicly perform them, including the exclusive rights to
stream the works over the Internet to the public.55 The Studios distribute and
license their works for home entertainment over various channels, including
“(1) physical Discs; (2) digital download through services like iTunes,
VUDU or Amazon Video; (3) on-demand streaming for short-term viewing
on a per transaction fee (e.g., iTunes Store or Google Play Store); or (4) subscription on-demand streaming (e.g., Netflix or Hulu).”56 The Studios often
negotiate higher licensing fees in exchange for granting licensees the exclusive right to show the works to the public during a specific time period.57
These online and digital distribution licenses are a large source of revenue
for the Studios.58

B. Technological Protection Measures
The Studios place technological protection measures (“TPMs”) on their
works to protect them from unauthorized access and copying.59 TPMs, such

53. Huntsman, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1–2; Meland, supra note 49.
54. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2017); Disney
Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 964 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 869 F.3d 848 (9th
Cir. 2017).
55. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852–53; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.
56. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852–53; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.
57. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852–53; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.
58. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852–53; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.
59. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 853.
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as Content Scramble System (“CSS”) and Advanced Access Content System
(“AACS”), control access to the copyrighted content on DVD and Blu-ray
discs.60 This access control allows consumers to watch or playback the content, but not copy the content.61 The DVD Copy Control Association (“DVD
CCA”) licenses the CSS technology to protect works on DVDs, while the
Advanced Access Content System Licensing Administrator, LLC (“AACS
LA”) develops and licenses the AACS encryption-based technology to protect high-definition content on Blu-ray disks.62 CSS and AACS are considered “technological measures that effectively control[] access to a work” for
the purposes of the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA, and circumvention of these technologies is prohibited.63
The use of TPMs began as the digital revolution was emerging in the
late 1990s.64 The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) gathered participating countries and agreed that each country “would enact legal
prohibitions against the circumvention of technological protection measures
employed to protect copyrighted materials against unauthorized access and
use.”65 From provisions of these WIPO treaties, the United States Congress
birthed what is now the DMCA.66 Congress noted that the new law was
created to “support new ways of disseminating copyrighted materials to users, and . . . safeguard the availability of legitimate uses of those materials
by individuals.”67
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Brief of DVD Copy Control Association, Inc. and Advance Access Content System
License Administrator, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 2, Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (1999); Brief of DVD Copy Control Ass’n, supra note 62,
at 3; see Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
64. Brief of DVD Copy Control Ass’n, supra note 62, at 4.
65. Id.; see World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms
Treaty art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997); see also World Intellectual
Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17
(1997).
66. Brief of DVD Copy Control Ass’n, supra note 62, at 4.
67. Id. at 4–5 (citation omitted).
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CSS was the first technology developed for this purpose to be applied
to the movie content stored on the then-new DVD discs.68 CSS originated
from a large team of experts “from motion picture, consumer electronics, and
information technology companies,” who converged to propose a “scrambling technology and a set of standardized rules regarding compliance with
particular requirements” that would govern the technology.69 The team’s
forward thinking produced “a set of technical specifications and a set of security requirements licensed under a licensing agreement requiring companies building DVD players to comply with those rules in order to build compliant products that would be permitted to decrypt the content recorded on
the DVD disks.”70 These technical specifications and security requirements
have been adopted industry-wide, and the DVD CCA now “licenses the
method for studios and other content companies to protect their content using
CSS on DVDs.”71
In the early 2000s, when technology advanced to high-definition displays, the companies from the three industries again worked together, as envisioned by Congress, to create what is now the Blu-ray disc.72 AACS technology was created and licensed by AACS LA to provide encryption
protection to digital content on Blu-ray discs, similar to the way CSS was
developed to provide protection from circumvention on DVDs.73 Individual
purchasers of DVDs and Blu-ray discs are not provided “the keys or other
cryptographic secrets” necessary for playback of the content on the discs.74
Instead, they must use a licensed DVD or Blu-ray disc player, which in turn
“must abide by the technical specifications and security requirements imposed by the licenses from DVD CCA or AACS LA.”75 Neither the CSS or
AACS license allows copying of the content onto a hard drive or other device

68. Id. at 5.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5–6.
71. Id. at 6.
72. Id. at 7.
73. Id. at 24.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id.
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for storage, or distribution of the content from the discs over the internet.76
VidAngel operates by circumventing these access control measures on the
discs in order to copy, store, reproduce, and distribute the content over the
internet to the public without the Studios’ authorization.

C. VidAngel’s Service
VidAngel offers customers the option to remove objectionable content
from existing movies and TV shows by selecting from categories such as
sex, violence, or language.77 The customer’s selections prompt VidAngel to
cut a sex scene entirely from a film, or mute all of the profanity in a television
show.78 VidAngel operates by lawfully purchasing physical DVDs and Bluray discs for each title it offers.79 It uses a “commercially available software
program” to decrypt and copy each disc, removes the TPMs, and then uploads the digital copy to a computer.80 After decryption, the works are converted into http live-streaming format and broken into segments that are
tagged for eighty different categories of inappropriate content.81
To watch a particular movie or television show, a new customer must
log in to the VidAngel website to establish their unique user ID, and purchase
a physical DVD or Blu-ray disc containing the work.82 Once a customer
purchases a work, “the disc is removed from [VidAngel’s] inventory and the
title is transferred to that customer’s unique user ID.”83 VidAngel “typically
maintains possession of the physical [disc] on behalf of the purchasers, but

76. Id.
77. Todd Spangler, Legally Embattled VidAngel Movie-Streaming Site Raises $10 Million
From Fans, VARIETY (Nov. 10, 2016), http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/vidangel-raises-10million-studio-copyright-lawsuit-1201914823/ [https://perma.cc/6W9J-XXEF].
78. See Spangler, supra note 77; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964–65.
79. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 853.
80. Id.; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.
81. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 853.
82. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.
83. Id.
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purchasers may request that the [disc] be sent to them or retrieve the [disc]
from VidAngel’s offices.”84
After purchasing the work, a customer selects objectionable content he
or she would like to remove from among the eighty categories available.85
Each customer must apply at least one filter in order to view a work.86 The
filtered version of the work can then be streamed to the customer on any
VidAngel-supported device, “including Roku, Apple TV, Smart TV, Amazon Fire TV, Android, Chromecast, iPad/iPhone and desktop or laptop computers.”87 The price for each individual work is $20, but the customer may
sell the work back to VidAngel for partial credit.88 VidAngel’s discs are sold
over and over again in this manner,89 such that the content on one disc can
be resold multiple times to different customers (e.g., instead of three people
purchasing three separate discs of the same work, VidAngel purchases one
disc and makes its content available to three people, effectively reducing the
Studios’ profit by two purchases).
Within a year of its launch, VidAngel’s customer base grew from 4,848
users to over 100,000 monthly active users.90 By the time the Studios filed
suit to enjoin VidAngel’s services, VidAngel was offering more than 2,500
movies and television shows to the public for purchase on its website—more
than eighty of which were the Studios’ works.91 For example, VidAngel
84. Id.
85. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 854.
86. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 965.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 964–65 (“Once a user has viewed a stream, the user may re-sell the DVD back to
VidAngel for a partial credit of the $20 purchase price. The sellback price decreases $1 per night
for standard definition (SD) purchases and $2 per night for high-definition (HD) purchases. Once
a user sells the movie back to VidAngel, the user’s access to the title is terminated and the remaining
balance is credited back to the user’s VidAngel account. For example: A $20 SD disk is owned
for 2 nights at $1 per night and sold back for $18 in sell-back credit. If a VidAngel customer keeps
a DVD for more than 20 days, he or she can either view it through the VidAngel platform in perpetuity, sell it back for $1 or $2 in credit, or VidAngel will send the DVD to the customer, if
requested.”).
89. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 854.
90. Id. at 854–55.
91. Id. at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964–65.
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began streaming Disney’s movie Star Wars: The Force Awakens while it
was lawfully only available for purchase on DVD or as a digital download.92
Likewise, VidAngel began streaming Fox’s movies The Martian and Brooklyn while they were licensed exclusively to HBO for on-demand streaming.93
VidAngel was not authorized by the Studios to copy, perform, or access any
of these works.94

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT VIDANGEL’S SERVICES
VIOLATED THE ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION OF THE DMCA
AND INFRINGED ON THE STUDIOS’ EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TO REPRODUCE
AND PUBLICLY PERFORM THEIR WORKS
In June 2016, the Studios filed suit against VidAngel seeking a preliminary injunction of VidAngel’s services.95 The Studios’ complaint alleged
copyright infringement in violation of their exclusive reproduction and public performance rights, and circumvention of TPMs in violation of the anticircumvention provision of the DMCA.96 In granting an injunction, the District Court considered (1) whether each of the Studios’ claims were likely to
succeed on their merits; (2) whether the Studios were likely to suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted; (3) whether the balance of hardship tipped in favor of the Studios; and (4) whether the injunction was in the
public interest.97

92. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 854.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 855.
95. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2017); Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 869 F.3d 848 (9th
Cir. 2017).
96. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
97. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 856 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008)).
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A. VidAngel’s Violation of the Anti-Circumvention Provision of the
DMCA
The DMCA states that “to ‘circumvent a technological measure’ means
to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise
to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure,
without the authority of the copyright owner.”98 The purchase of a DVD or
Blu-ray disc does not give the purchaser the authority to decrypt the TPMs
on the discs.99 In fact, courts have previously determined that “the purchase
of a DVD only conveys the authority to view the DVD, not to decrypt it.”100
VidAngel conceded that it used a “commercially available software
program” to decrypt the TPMs on the Studios’ discs, and failed to provide
evidence that the Studios had explicitly or implicitly authorized DVD or Bluray purchasers, including VidAngel, to circumvent the TPMs on their discs
in order to view the works on a platform such as VidAngel’s streaming service.101 Thus, the District Court found that VidAngel violated the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA by decrypting and removing the TPMs
that controlled access to the Studios’ copyrighted works on DVDs and Bluray discs.102

B. VidAngel’s Copyright Infringement
VidAngel’s circumvention of the TPMs on the Studios’ discs allowed
it to create unauthorized digital copies of each work, resulting in a copyright
infringement action.103 To succeed in its copyright infringement claim, the
Studios were required to show that they had valid copyright ownership in the
works and that VidAngel violated one or more of the Studios’ exclusive
rights as copyright owners.104 The District Court found that the Studios had
demonstrated ownership of the copyrighted works by providing certificates
98. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999).
99. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
100. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 967.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 966–69.
104. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 969; see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
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of registration issued by the United States Copyright Office.105 Since a certificate of registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright
and of the facts stated in the certificate,”106 the only factor at issue was
whether VidAngel violated one of the Studios’ exclusive rights under 17
U.S.C. § 106.107

1. VidAngel Violated the Studios’ Exclusive Right to Reproduce
Their Works
The Copyright Act grants copyright owners the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work” under § 106(1).108 In MAI Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc., the Circuit Court held that transferring digital work
“‘from a permanent storage device to a computer’s RAM [or storage]’ infringes the reproduction right.”109 As the District Court noted, while
“the MAI Sys. Corp. decision addressed the infringement of computer software, the same analysis applies to the digital transfer [of] other types of copyrighted work.”110 VidAngel admitted to making copies of the Studios’
works “onto a computer system and third-party servers.”111 VidAngel decrypted the discs, created “intermediate” files that it tagged for over eighty
types of objectionable content, broke them into approximately 1,300 fragments, and then encrypted those fragments and stored them in “a secure, access-controlled location in the cloud.”112 The Ninth Circuit has previously
specified that “on its face, the language of 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) unambiguously encompasses and proscribes ‘intermediate copying.’”113 In order to
105. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 969.
106. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976).
107. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 969; see 17 U.S.C. § 106.
108. 17 U.S.C § 106(1).
109. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (quoting MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 970 (quoting Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir.
1992)).

GARCIA_MACROS VER.2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

3/19/2019 11:43 AM

FILTER WARS

19

constitute a “copy” under the Copyright Act, the “infringing work must be
fixed in some tangible form, ‘from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.’”114 Because VidAngel’s fragmented copies were able to be
perceived with the aid of VidAngel’s software, the District Court found that
VidAngel’s service amounted to copyright infringement for violating the
Studios’ exclusive right to copy and reproduce its own works.115

2. VidAngel Violated the Studios’ Exclusive Right to Publicly
Perform Their Own Works
Under § 106(4), copyright owners are also granted the exclusive right
“to perform [their] copyrighted work[s] publicly.”116 A “public performance” is when someone “transmits or otherwise communicates a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or
process.”117 A transmission is made to the public if “the relationship between
. . . the transmitter of the performance, and the audience . . . is a commercial,
‘public’ relationship[,] regardless of where the viewing takes place.”118
While VidAngel asserted that its service did not engage in unlawful
public performances “because [it] stream[ed] filtered versions of motion pictures created at the direction of and owned by its customers,” the District
Court maintained that VidAngel’s customers were never the lawful owners
of the digital content streamed via VidAngel’s service.119 The ownership
granted to the lawful purchaser of a DVD or Blu-ray disc extends only to the
physical disc, not to the digital content on the disc.120 Furthermore, VidAngel streamed the works from a master copy stored on its server, not from a

114. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1518; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
115. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 970.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 101; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (quoting Warner Bros. Entm’t,
Inc. v. WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2011)).
118. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (quoting Warner Bros., 824 F. Supp. 2d at
1010).
119. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 970–71.
120. Id.
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disc lawfully purchased and owned by the customer.121 In other words, ownership of a DVD or Blu-ray disc only gives a purchaser authorization to view
the content on the DVD or Blu-ray disc, “not to decrypt it for the purpose of
viewing it on an alternative platform” like VidAngel’s streaming service.122
Therefore, the District Court held that VidAngel had unlawfully streamed
unauthorized copies of the Studios’ works to the public in violation of the
Studios’ exclusive public performance rights.123 The District Court concluded by stating that the Studios’ had a strong likelihood of success on their
copyright infringement claim.124

C. VidAngel’s FMA Defense
VidAngel denied copyright infringement and violation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, and instead raised two defenses to the
Studios’ claims: (1) legal authorization under the FMA, and (2) fair use.125
The District Court found that “[n]either the plain language nor the legislative
history of the FMA support VidAngel’s position,”126 and pointed out that, in
fact, the legislative history directly contradicts VidAngel’s assertion “that
the FMA provides an exemption to the anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA.”127 Senator Orrin Hatch, who introduced the FMA to the United
States Senate, specified that the FMA does not provide any exemption or
defense to the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA.128 In other words,
the FMA has not been recognized as a defense to unlawful circumvention
under the DMCA. Instead, the FMA provides an exemption from copyright
infringement for filtering limited portions of movies and creating a computer

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 971–74.
126. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 968.
127. Id.
128. 150 CONG. REC. 11,852, at S11,853 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
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program or other technology that enables filtering, like ClearPlay’s technology, so long as (1) the filtration is done by or at the direction of a member of
a private household, (2) the performance or transmission of the filtered work
comes from an authorized copy of the movie, and (3) no fixed copy of the
filtered version is created by the computer or other technology, meaning it is
not stored on a computer, device, or in the cloud.129
Here, the District Court held that VidAngel streamed the works to its
customers from an unauthorized copy, because it streamed from a digital
copy that it acquired by circumventing TPMs on the Studios’ discs in violation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.130 In other words,
because VidAngel unlawfully decrypted the discs instead of lawfully acquiring a license from the Studios to decrypt the discs, its performance and reproduction of those works were unauthorized. Further, the court found that
the authorization requirement is a “clear indication that the FMA is not intended to displace a copyright holder’s exclusive reproduction right.”131
Additionally, the District Court rejected VidAngel’s argument “that a
filtering service that complies with the FMA, need not satisfy any other provision[] of the Copyright Act” because it was in direct contradiction to the
last sentence of the FMA, which provides that “[n]othing in [the FMA] shall
be construed to imply further rights under section 106 of [the Copyright
Act], or to have any effect on defenses or limitations on rights granted under
any other section of [the Copyright Act].”132 Thus, the District Court found
that VidAngel’s service did not comply with the express language of the
FMA, and that the FMA did not provide a defense to VidAngel’s copyright
infringement.133

129. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2005); VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 971; VidAngel, Inc., 869
F.3d at 857.
130. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 971.
131. Id. at 972.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 110; VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 858; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at
972.
133. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 972.
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D. VidAngel’s Fair Use Defense
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
VidAngel asserted that its use of the Studios’ copyrighted works were
fair use.134 The first fair use factor considers “the purpose and character of
the use.”135 This factor asks “to what extent the new work is transformative”
from the original, whether it supplants the original, and whether the new
work’s purpose is commercial or not.136 The Supreme Court has held that a
use is transformative if it “adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the [original work] with new expression, meaning, or message.”137 VidAngel admitted that its use was commercial and that
it profited from the Studios’ works.138 However, VidAngel argued that its
filtering service was transformative because it filtered the Studios’ works for
at least one category of objectionable content before streaming them to
VidAngel customers.139 The District Court rejected this argument, finding
that “VidAngel’s service [did] not add anything to [the Studios’] works,” and
“simply [omitted] portions” of the works.140 In Clean Flicks of Colo., the
court rejected a fair use defense asserted by defendants who provided a service similar to VidAngel’s service.141 The Clean Flicks of Colo. court ruled
that the “defendants’ editing of objectionable content was not transformative
because it added nothing to the copyrighted works, and only removed ‘a
small percentage of most of the films.’”142

134. Id.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1992).
136. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
137. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579.
138. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 972.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. See generally Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236
(D. Colo. 2006).
142. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
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The District Court found that VidAngel’s use of the Studios’ works
served the “same intrinsic entertainment value that is protected by [the Studios’] copyrights,” and was therefore not transformative.143 VidAngel’s
commercial use of the Studios’ works, “coupled with [the] non-transformative nature of the [filtered] copies weigh[ed] heavily in favor of the [Studios]” under the first fair use factor.144

2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second fair use factor considers “the nature of the copyrighted
work.”145 The Circuit Court has held that “works such as original . . . motion
pictures . . . are creative in nature and thus fit squarely within the core of
copyright protection.”146 Thus, the District Court found that this factor
weighed in the Studios’ favor.

3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third fair use factor considers the quantity and quality of the portion taken from the original work by the copy.147 The District Court found
that VidAngel copied the Studios’ works in their entirety.148 The court rejected VidAngel’s argument that customers would never watch exact copies
of the original works because VidAngel required each user to apply at least
one filter to a purchased work before viewing it.149 The District Court held
that “[d]espite the fact that VidAngel’s service omits portions of each work,

143. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
144. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
146. Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2003).
147. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.
148. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
149. Id.
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the essential storyline, cinematography, and acting portrayals remain unchanged. These elements are the heart of the movie.”150 Thus, the third fair
use factor weighed in favor of the Studios.151

4. Effect of the Use on the Potential Market for or Value of the
Copyrighted Work
The fourth fair use factor considers “current market harm and ‘whether
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant
. . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’
for the original.”152 Furthermore, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has held that when
‘the intended use is for commercial gain,’ the likelihood of market harm
‘may be presumed.’”153 VidAngel asserted that the filtered versions of the
works were not substitutes for the Studios’ original works.154 The District
Court rejected this argument, stating that “the fact that VidAngel’s streams
are ‘composed primarily’ of [the Studios’] works . . . with little added or
changed makes the streams ’more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original.’”155 Therefore, the District Court found the
fourth fair use factor weighed in the Studios’ favor.156

E. The District Court Granted a Preliminary Injunction in Favor of
the Studios
Having found that the Studios’ claims were likely to succeed on their
merits and that VidAngel had failed to defend against the claims, the District
Court next considered whether a preliminary injunction was appropriate.157

150. Id. at 973–74.
151. Id. at 974.
152. Id.; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590.
153. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974; Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512
F.3d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 2008).
154. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
155. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974; see Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.
156. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974.
157. Id.
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1. Likelihood of Imminent Irreparable Injury
The Studios argued that VidAngel’s service interfered with their “basic
right to control how, when and through which channels consumers can view
their copyrighted works.”158 The District Court accepted this argument, finding that VidAngel had operated an “infringing service without the normal
licensing restrictions imposed by [the Studios],” and hence interfered with
the Studios’ “ability to control the use and transmission of their [c]opyrighted works, thereby, causing irreparable injury.”159 The Senior Vice President of Digital Distribution at 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment testified that the Studios’ exclusive rights “are critical to providing [the Studios]
the opportunity to earn a return on their substantial investments” because the
Studios exercise their rights through licensing agreements.160 The Studios
argued that “[b]ecause VidAngel operate[d] without any license and perform[ed] [the Studios’] works during negotiated exclusivity periods[,] it interfere[d] with [the Studios’] exercise of their exclusive rights and frustrate[d] [their] ability to negotiate for similar rights in the future.”161
The Studios also claimed that VidAngel’s service threatened to harm
the Studios’ “relationships and goodwill with authorized distributors by undermining their ability to provide licensed offerings.”162 The Studios pointed
out “that licensees have complained in partnership meetings, and especially
in negotiations, that it is difficult to compete with services like VidAngel that
do not act pursuant to licensing restrictions.”163 It is well established that
harm to one’s negotiating position and goodwill with licensees is irreparable
because it is “neither easily calculable, nor easily compensable.”164 There-

158. Id. at 975.
159. Id. (citing Warner Bros., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1012).
160. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 975.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 976.
164. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138,
1147 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Warner Bros., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1013).
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fore, the District Court found that VidAngel’s service caused irreparable injury because it undermined the Studios’ negotiating position with licensees
and damaged their goodwill with licensees.165

2. Balance of Hardships
The District Court found that the balance of hardships tipped sharply
in the Studios’ favor.166 The District Court disregarded VidAngel’s plea that
an injunction would cause them “to suffer an unimaginable financial hardship” because lost profits suffered from unlawful activity is an argument that
“merits little equitable consideration.”167 The Circuit Court has previously
held that a defendant “cannot complain of the harm that will befall it when
[it is] properly forced to desist from its infringing activities.”168

3. Public Interest
The District Court found that a preliminary injunction was in the public
interest.169 It pointed out that an injunction here “would not prevent VidAngel or any other company from providing a filtering service similar to
ClearPlay’s,” and thus would not “negatively impact the public interest in
watching filtered content in private.”170 Furthermore, the court stated that it
is “virtually axiomatic that the public interest can only be served by upholding copyright protections and correspondingly, preventing the misappropriation of skills, creative energies, and resources [that have been] invested in
the protected work.”171

165. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 976.
166. Id. at 977–78.
167. Id. (citing Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir.
1995)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 978.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Warner Bros., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1015).
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4. The District Court’s Decision
VidAngel expressed that it would continue to offer the Studios’ works
and other future releases, unless enjoined.172 Thus, after reviewing the factors, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the Studios.173 VidAngel was enjoined “from copying and ‘streaming, transmitting,
or otherwise publicly performing or displaying any of [the Studios’] copyrighted works,’ ‘circumventing technological measures protecting [the Studios’] copyrighted works,’ or ‘engaging in any other activity that violates,
directly or indirectly’” the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA or the
Studios’ exclusive use of their copyrighted works.174

V. THE CIRCUIT COURT AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION
A. Copyright Infringement Claim
When a defendant decrypts the TPMs on a work and then reproduces
and publicly performs that work as VidAngel did, “it is liable for both circumvention in violation of § 1201(a)(1)(A) and copyright infringement in
violation of § 106.”175 Here, the Circuit Court found that the District Court
correctly concluded that VidAngel infringed on the Studios’ exclusive reproduction rights in their copyrighted works.176 The Circuit Court rejected
VidAngel’s argument that it could lawfully re-sell or rent the works because
it had lawfully purchased an original version from which it subsequently
made edited copies.177 The Circuit Court cited to 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), which
states that lawful owners of a particular copy of a copyrighted work are only
entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy, not to
reproduce the work.178
172. Id. at 969.
173. Id. at 979; see VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855.
174. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 979.
175. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 864 (9th Cir. 2017); see Murphy
v. Millennium Radio Grp., L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295, 300 (3d Cir. 2011).
176. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 856.
177. Id. at 856–57.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2008); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 856–57.
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B. DMCA Anti-Circumvention Violation Claim
The Circuit Court additionally found that VidAngel violated the
DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision by decrypting the access controls on
the Studios’ discs without authorization.179 Decrypting an encrypted work,
such as a movie on a DVD or Blu-ray disk, without the authorization of the
copyright owner is circumvention.180
VidAngel conceded that the CCS and AACS technologies on the Studios’ discs are TPMs which encrypt access controls to protect the copyrighted works.181 These TPMs are placed on the discs to prevent circumvention and allow copyright owners like the Studios to exercise their exclusive
rights over their own works. VidAngel admitted that it used software to decrypt these encrypted TPMs and effectively circumvented the access controls
to the works.182 VidAngel argued, however, that “like all lawful purchasers,
VidAngel is authorized by the Studios to decrypt [the TPMs] to view the
discs’ content” and is therefore exempt from circumvention liability by section 1201(a)(3)(A) of the DMCA.183
As previous noted, section
1201(a)(3)(A) exempts from liability only those whom a copyright owner
authorizes to circumvent the encrypted work, not those who have the authority only to view the work.184 VidAngel argued that as a valid purchaser of
the DVDs and Blu-ray disks with the authority to view the copyrighted
works, VidAngel was exempt from liability because the Studios impliedly
authorized it and all other lawful purchasers of the discs to circumvent the
TPMs.185 In other words, VidAngel argued that because it lawfully purchased a copy of each DVD, it had the authority to decrypt the DVDs.186
This argument was addressed and rejected in MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., which adopted the Second Circuit approach set
179. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (emphasis in original).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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forth in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley.187 Corley rejected the very
argument that VidAngel made: “that an individual who buys a DVD has the
‘authority of the copyright owner’ to view the DVD, and therefore is exempted from the DMCA . . . when the buyer circumvents an encryption technology in order to view the DVD on a competing platform.”188 Instead, section 1201(a)(3)(A) only exempts from circumvention liability those “who
would ‘decrypt’ an encrypted DVD with the authority of a copyright owner,
not those who would ‘view’ a DVD with the authority of a copyright
owner.”189 Similar to the defendant in Corley, VidAngel “‘offered no evidence that [the Studios] have either explicitly or implicitly authorized DVD
buyers to circumvent encryption technology’ to access the digital contents
of their discs.”190 Lawful purchasers “have permission only to view their
purchased discs with a DVD or Blu-ray player licensed to decrypt the
TPMs,” as intended by the exemption.191
The Circuit Court likened VidAngel’s methods—specifically, its use
of external software to decrypt the TPMs to obtain digital copies of the discs’
contents—to theft. The Circuit Court maintained that VidAngel’s actions
were “exactly like ‘breaking into a locked room’” for which VidAngel was
never given the keys, “in order to obtain a copy of a [work].”192 The exemption applies only to authorized disc players, which are given the “keys” necessary for lawfully decrypting the TPMs.193 Furthermore, nothing in the legislative history suggests that VidAngel is exempt from circumvention
liability simply because there are authorized ways to access the Studios’

187. MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 953 n.16 (9th Cir. 2011);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001).
188. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863 (quoting Universal City, 273 F.3d at 444).
189. Universal City, 273 F.3d at 444.
190. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 864–65.
193. Id.
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works.194 Therefore, the Circuit Court found that VidAngel’s service was an
unlawful violation of the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA.195

C. The Circuit Court Rejected VidAngel’s FMA Defense
The Circuit Court rejected VidAngel’s FMA defense and found that
“VidAngel does not stream from an authorized copy of the Studios’ motion
pictures; it streams from the ‘master file’ copy it created by ‘ripping’ the
movies from discs after circumventing their TPMs.”196 The Circuit Court
concluded that statutory reading, statutory context, and legislative history
support this interpretation.197 The most natural statutory reading, the Circuit
Court reasoned, “is that the filtered performance or transmission itself must
be ‘from’ an authorized copy of the motion picture,” not from an unauthorized reproduction of the work.198 Furthermore, the FMA was created with
the protection of copyright owners’ intellectual property rights in mind, and
the statute itself states that it should not be construed or interpreted to imply
further rights than those provided.199 Accepting VidAngel’s “interpretation
of the statute—which permits unlawful decryption and copying prior to filtering—would not preserve ‘protection of intellectual property rights,’” and
would have lasting effects “on the existing copyright scheme.”200 Moreover,
Senator Orrin Hatch, who sponsored the FMA, “stated that the [FMA]
‘should be narrowly construed’ to avoid ‘impacting established doctrines of
copyright’ law.”201 Senator Hatch insisted that any argument that a greater
freedom of viewing and modification under the FMA requires the violation
of copyright law protections “‘should be rejected as counter to legislative

194. Id. at 865.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 860.
197. Id. at 857–60.
198. Id. at 858; see 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2005).
199. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 858–59.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 859–60.
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intent or technological necessity.’”202 In their statements, Senator Hatch and
the House of Representatives collectively identified ClearPlay’s business as
a model that was intended to be protected by the FMA.203 Huntsman, the
court argued, is the only other case to construe the FMA in a similar context
and supports this interpretation.204

D. The Circuit Court Rejected VidAngel’s Fair Use Defense
The Circuit Court further rejected VidAngel’s fair use affirmative defense to copyright infringement after reviewing the fair use factors.205
VidAngel acknowledged that the second and third fair use factors—“the nature of the copyrighted work” and “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”206—weighed
against it because its filtered versions of the works were used for entertainment, and kept a substantial portion of the original work intact.207 VidAngel
claimed, however, that the District Court abused its discretion as to the first
and fourth fair use factors.208 Ultimately the Circuit Court disagreed, holding
that the first factor—“the purpose and character of the use”209—weighed
against VidAngel because its omission of content from the Studios’ original
works did not add anything new to the works and was not transformative.210
VidAngel’s policy of simply omitting scenes and dialogue did not change
the expression, meaning, or message of the films, and therefore, VidAngel
202. Id.
203. Id. at 860.
204. Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 109–33, pt. 1, at 70 (2005); Derivative Rights, Moral
Rights, and Movie Filtering Technology: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (ClearPlay CEO testimony). See generally Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. CIV.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL
1993421, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005).
205. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 860–62.
206. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
207. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 860–62.
208. Id. at 860.
209. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
210. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 860–62.
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failed to meet its burden as to the first factor.211 The Circuit Court also found
that VidAngel failed to meet its burden as to the fourth factor—“the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work”212—because its “service [is] an effective substitute for [the Studios’]
unfiltered works” and acts as a replacement in the market.213

E. VidAngel Was Enjoined from Continuing Its Filtering Services
Having found that VidAngel failed in its fair use and FMA defenses
against the Studios’ copyright infringement and DMCA violation claims, the
Circuit Court next considered whether it was appropriate to affirm the District Court’s preliminary injunction against VidAngel.214 The Circuit Court
found that refusing to grant an injunction against VidAngel would cause irreparable harm to the Studios because “VidAngel’s service undermines the
value of the Studios’ copyrighted works . . . and their goodwill and negotiating leverage with licensees.”215 The Circuit Court also found that the balance of equities tipped in favor of the Studios because, firstly, VidAngel’s
illegal activities do not merit equitable protection, and secondly, the financial
hardship VidAngel would face as a result of being forced to cease its illegal
activities pale in priority to the exclusive rights of copyright ownership and
the protection of intellectual property rights.216 Finally, the Circuit Court
found that a preliminary injunction against VidAngel was in the public interest because “‘the public has a compelling interest in protecting copyright
owners’ marketable rights to their work[s] and the economic incentive to
continue creating television programming’ and motion pictures.”217

211. Id.
212. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
213. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 861.
214. Id. at 860–62.
215. Id. at 865–66.
216. Id. at 866–67.
217. Id. at 867.
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VI. VIDANGEL’S SERVICES ARE CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE OF
COPYRIGHT LAW, THE ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION OF THE
DMCA, AND THE FMA
A. Filtering Is a Red Herring
VidAngel’s Chief Executive Officer, Neal Harmon, insists that VidAngel will aggressively pursue an appeal, if necessary, and has vowed to use
“the $10 million reaped in a crowdfunding campaign to fight the case all the
way to the Supreme Court.”218 VidAngel has framed this issue as Hollywood
studios lashing out at a family-friendly filtering service.219 However, “the
[S]tudios have repeatedly made it clear that [] filtering is not the issue,”—
the issue is “the unauthorized streaming and [] protection circumvention” of
copyrighted works.220 In a joint statement, the Studios addressed this red
herring, stating that “[t]his case was never about filtering. The [Circuit]
Court recognized that the Family Movie Act does not provide a defense to
VidAngel’s infringing acts of ripping, copying and streaming copyrighted
movies and TV shows.”221 Indeed, “[r]emove the filtering from [this] case
and it’s hard to imagine that [a] film studio[] would allow a streaming service
to ‘buy’ and ‘buy back’ [its] DVDs in this manner unchallenged.”222 In fact,
this battle is not just between VidAngel and a handful of large Hollywood
companies, it is far more reaching than that. This case is about creators and
contributors of all varieties and sizes who rely on the protection of copyright
law and the current interpretation of the FMA to make a living and invest in
future works.223 It is about the “writers, musical composers and recording
218. Gene Maddaus, Judge Orders VidAngel to Shut Down, VARIETY (Dec. 12, 2016, 7:15
PM),
http://variety.com/2016/biz/news/vidangel-shut-down-copyright-violation-1201940368/
[https://perma.cc/BY3V-B67T]; Gene Maddaus, Facing a Shutdown Order, VidAngel Will Start
Making Movies, VARIETY (Dec. 13, 2016, 8:38 PM), http://variety.com/2016/biz/news/vidangelstudio-fight-supreme-court-injunction-1201941655/ [https://perma.cc/YAS7-KQCG].
219. Jonathan Bailey, VidAngel: It’s Not About Filtering, PLAGIARISMTODAY (Jan. 12,
2017),
http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2017/01/12/vidangel-important-case-dont-know
[https://perma.cc/52AN-M9RG].
220. Id.
221. Maddaus, Judge Orders VidAngel to Shut Down, supra note 219.
222. Bailey, supra note 220.
223. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1–3,
Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).
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artists, journalists, documentarians and filmmakers, graphic and visual artists, photographers and software developers,” and every freelance and small
business copyright owner affected by the unauthorized use of his or her
work.224 If VidAngel’s methods were allowed to obtain legitimacy, the
availability of unlicensed, less stringent methods of accessing copyrighted
works would undermine the legitimate system in place.

B. VidAngel Misinterprets the FMA
The crux of VidAngel’s misunderstanding of the FMA lies in its belief
that once it purchases an authorized copy of a work, it is authorized to use it
however it chooses.225 This is not the correct interpretation of the FMA.226
The possession or purchase of an authorized copy of work does not authorize
a party to subsequently reproduce fixed copies or publicly perform and distribute the works, as VidAngel did.227 Importantly, the Studios purposefully
placed TPMs on their discs to prevent this type of unauthorized control or
access to the works.228 VidAngel has admitted that it decrypts these protection measures, which is a violation of the DMCA, and stores unauthorized
fixed copies of the original works on its servers for later distribution to the
public via streaming.229 Moreover, VidAngel has admitted that the Studios
have declined to grant it licenses to copy and stream the Studios’ works.230
Its argument rests on the proposition that “because it has received an implied
permission to view the content on a DVD” as a lawful purchaser, it also has
permission to circumvent the access control measures on the discs as it sees
fit.231 This is not the case. VidAngel has neither received permission to
circumvent the TPMs on the Studios’ works, nor does the FMA exempt this

224. Id. at 1.
225. Id. at 6–8.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 6–7.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 15–16.
230. Id. at 26.
231. Id.
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DMCA violation in any implied form.232 Allowing VidAngel’s interpretation to survive “would create a giant loophole in copyright law, sanctioning
infringement so long as it filters some content and a copy of the work was
lawfully purchased at some point.”233 As the Circuit Court pointed out, “virtually all piracy of movies originates in some way from a legitimate copy. If
the mere purchase of an authorized copy alone precluded infringement liability under the FMA, the statute would severely erode the commercial value
of the public performance right in the digital context.”234 In fact, VidAngel
is not under attack for providing filtered movies, but for operating an unlicensed streaming service that makes unauthorized fixed reproductions and
public performances of other creators’ works in violation of their exclusive
rights.235

C. VidAngel’s Proclaimed Pure Intentions Are Irrelevant to
Copyright Law
VidAngel CEO Neal Harmon insists that VidAngel fights for parents’
rights to control what their children see in the privacy of their own homes.236
But whether or not VidAngel believes its cause is wholesome is irrelevant to
copyright law. In Clean Flicks of Colo., the court addressed a similar argument from defendants concerning their service:
The accused parties make much of their public policy argument
and have submitted many communications from viewers expressing their appreciation for the opportunity to view movies in the
setting of the family home without concern for any harmful effects on their children. This argument is inconsequential to copyright law and is addressed in the wrong forum. This Court is not
free to determine the social value of copyrighted works. What is

232. Id. at 27.
233. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 2017).
234. Id.
235. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 5–6.
236. Gene Maddaus, Appeals Court Rejects VidAngel’s Bid to Overturn Injunction,
VARIETY (Aug. 24, 2017, 10:39 AM), http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/vidangel-injunction-upheld-appeals-court-1202538011/ [https://perma.cc/SC99-XNKT].
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protected are the creator’s rights to protect its creation in the form
in which it was created.237
VidAngel’s consumer demand argument—that families and supporters
of VidAngel have shown desire for a filtering service238—has been previously dismissed by other courts in other cases:
Stripped to its essence, defendant’s “consumer protection” argument amounts to nothing more than a bald claim that defendant
should be able to misappropriate plaintiffs’ property simply because there is a consumer demand for it. This hardly appeals to
the conscience of equity.239
Despite VidAngel’s assertion that it is an innocent supplier of clean
content in response to a market demand for family-friendly works, it nevertheless unlawfully profits from the creative works and goodwill of others. It
thieves with good intention, it claims, filling a market gap that it has no legal
right to fill. Market demand for a good or service does not justify illegal
activity, and the benevolent thief is still a thief.

D. VidAngel Failed to Seek Exemption for its Services Through the
Triennial Rulemaking Process
The triennial rulemaking process was introduced in 2000 as the “Congressionally authorized regulatory mechanism for a proprietor of new tech-

237. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (D. Colo.
2006).
238. Todd Spangler, Legally Embattled VidAngel Movie-Streaming Site Raises $10 Million
From Fans, VARIETY (Nov. 10, 2016), http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/vidangel-raises-10million-studio-copyright-lawsuit-1201914823/ [https://perma.cc/6W9J-XXEF] (“According to
VidAngel, nearly 40,000 customers have donated to its legal defense fund, and a total of 7,553
individuals invested in the mini IPO. About 8,000 customers have written letters to federal district
court hearing the case explaining why movie filtering is important to them, according to the company. The company touts the support of several religious, conservative and parents’ organizations.”).
239. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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nology or an individual user to seek a lawful exemption to the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.”240 These proceedings permit “the Librarian of Congress . . . to grant limited exemptions every three years to ensure
that the public can still engage in fair and other non-infringing uses of
works.”241 The DVD CCA and AACS LA, as the creators and licensors of
the CCS and AACS technologies that encrypt DVDs and Blu-ray discs, have
participated in every triennial proceeding since the launch of their respective
technologies.242 VidAngel, on the other hand, has never participated in any
of these proceedings, nor requested an exemption that would apply to its service.243 If VidAngel sought to create an exemption for its services, it could
have exercised this avenue. However, VidAngel failed to utilize the
DMCA’s recognized process, and instead claimed an exemption that was
almost certainly not created with the intention of protecting this type of service from circumvention liability.

E. An Alternative: The ClearPlay Model
If VidAngel intends to survive this latest injunction, perhaps it should
consider changing its filtering business model. The FMA expressly exempts
from liability (1) “individuals who [filter] limited portions of films that they
are viewing in their homes,” and (2) “companies who create and provide
software or technology to facilitate such activities.”244 As discussed in Part
II.C, the FMA was enacted in the wake of litigation against two filtering
companies, CleanFlicks and ClearPlay,245 and ultimately carved out a narrow
exception “to insulate ClearPlay and similar businesses from copyright liability.”246 Like VidAngel, CleanFlicks filtered out objectionable content by

240. Brief of DVD Copy Control Association, Inc. and Advance Access Content System
License Administrator, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 21, Disney
Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).
241. Id. at 20.
242. Id. at 21.
243. Id.
244. Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital Age,
44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1062 (2007).
245. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 23.
246. Menell, supra note 245, at 1062.
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purchasing DVDs at retail before creating fixed copies of the edited works,
and then distributed those copies to the public.247 The difference between
CleanFlicks and VidAngel was that CleanFlicks fixed its copies in physical
DVDs, whereas VidAngel fixed its copies in its online cloud.248 Another
difference was that CleanFlicks sold and rented its filtered physical DVDs,
whereas VidAngel streamed the filtered content from its server straight to
the public.249 The court found that the FMA did not exempt CleanFlicks’s
service from copyright infringement, and further enjoined CleanFlicks’s
business, naming it illegitimate.250
ClearPlay, on the other hand, provided DVD playback equipment that
worked in conjunction with the authorized copies of the DVDs that
ClearPlay customers had purchased themselves.251 ClearPlay did not create
fixed copies of works, but rather offered equipment that filtered objectionable portions of the DVDs as they were played in the home of the purchaser.252
ClearPlay won its battle against Hollywood studios in 2005 by distinguishing
itself as the filtering model that neither circumvents access controls in violation of the DMCA, nor infringes on the exclusive rights of copyright owners
by reproducing fixed copies or publicly performing the works.253 In support
of the Studios, ClearPlay had a law professor at Georgetown University write
an amicus brief distinguishing itself from VidAngel and its services:254

247. Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 23–24.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243–44.
251. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 23–24.
252. Id.
253. Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. CIV.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at
*1 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005); Gene Maddaus, ClearPlay Is No Longer Offering Filtered Movies to
Stream, VARIETY (Feb. 7, 2017, 3:02 PM), http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/clearplay-streamingnew-releases-google-shutdown-1201980650/ [https://perma.cc/S8JQ-RQUJ].
254. Herb Scribner, ClearPlay Says it Doesn’t Support VidAngel in Streaming Rights Case,
DESERET NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017, 6:25 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865674005/ClearPlay-says-it-doesnt-support-VidAngel-in-streaming-rights-case.html
[https://perma.cc/H7Q8-UJRQ].
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As ClearPlay has demonstrated over 17 years, it is not necessary
to circumvent an access control measure, or make unauthorized
copies or public performances in order to provide families with
effective filtering technology. VidAngel’s misinterpretation of
the FMA is simply unsupportable either by the plain language or
the legislative history, and acceptance of VidAngel’s infringing
technology would undercut those that have worked within the law
to develop compliant technologies.255

F. An Alternative: Legislative Support
VidAngel contends that the legislative history of the FMA indicates
that the FMA was not written so narrowly as to apply only to the filtering
services that were in existence at the time it was drafted, but that it was written to broadly encompass future filtering technology as well.256 In June 2017,
Senator Hatch wrote a letter to Chris Dodd, chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Motion Picture Association of America, concerning the FMA:
[The FMA] was intended to enable families to use filtering technology
to screen out graphic violence, vulgarity, and explicit sexual content from
movies and television shows. Crucially, the [FMA] sought to balance the
interests of families in screening out objectionable content with the rights of
copyright holders. It applies only to filtering technology used on authorized
copies of movies and television shows, prohibits viewers from creating bootleg versions, and does not protect any conduct that impairs core copyright
protections.257
In a separate statement, Senator Hatch expressed his belief that it is
“essential that we protect content creators’ intellectual property rights.”258
Additionally, Senator Hatch noted that infringing transmissions of works are
255. Brief for ClearPlay, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees at 15, Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).
256. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 20–24.
257. Letter from Orrin G. Hatch et al., U.S. Senator, Congress of the U.S., to Chris Dodd,
Chairman and CEO, Motion Picture Ass’n of America (June 21, 2017), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d30ba79d-537c-41f3-8933-2f69a7febae1/Filtering%20Letter_website[1].pdf [https://perma.cc/CW3N-8A8T] [hereinafter Hatch Letter].
258. Herb Schribner, Hatch on VidAngel’s Technology: ‘I Want To Find A Way For Everyone To Win On This Issue’ (+video), Deseret News (June 21, 2017, 1:35 PM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865683416/Hatch-weighs-in-on-VidAngel-technologysends-letter-to-MPAA.html [https://perma.cc/AX6B-TQ7C].
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not rendered non-infringing by the FMA simply because they omit or filter
portions of the original works.259 It is unlikely that Congress would have
approved of filtering services at odds with the exclusive rights of copyright
holders, since the FMA was “expressly designed not to affect a copyright
owner’s” exclusive rights.260 As the Circuit Court noted, the FMA was created with the protection of copyright owners’ intellectual property rights in
mind—and the statute itself stated that nothing in its language should be construed or interpreted to imply further rights than those provided.261
In 2004, ClearPlay asked Congress to “clarify through appropriate legislation that muting and skipping over copyrighted content, without making
an unauthorized copy did not violate the Copyright Act.”262 Congress, in
turn, enacted the FMA as part of the Family Entertainment and Copyright
Act of 2005, to permit filtering in accordance with its terms.263 As a result
of this legislation, the Huntsman court dismissed ClearPlay as a defendant,
and kept CleanFlicks as party to the suit, which it eventually enjoined from
continuing its infringing services.264 If VidAngel cannot convince a court of
its interpretation of the FMA and copyright law, it is free to seek action from
Congress as ClearPlay did over a decade ago, to include new filtering technologies that were not covered or comprehended by the FMA at the time it
was written.265

G. An Alternative: Content Production
VidAngel could consider branching out to content production. There
is a gap in the market for cleaner content, evidenced by the many lawsuits
launched by Hollywood studios against companies that offered these ser-

259. 150 CONG. REC. 11,852, at S11,853 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
260. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 859.
261. Id. at 858–59.
262. Brief for ClearPlay, Inc., supra note 256, at 1.
263. Id.
264. See generally Huntsman, 2005 WL 1993421; Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d
1236.
265. Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 20.
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vices. VidAngel can capitalize on this demand by creating or producing content that conforms to its company goals. Streaming sites like Netflix and
Hulu offer original productions, and assuming VidAngel’s true intention is
to provide wholesome entertainment to the world, it might consider producing films or series which provide cleaner content to viewers. VidAngel
seemingly contemplated this option in 2016, when its CEO Neal Harmon
announced that “VidAngel Studios” would be launching in early 2017, “producing ‘family friendly’ content.”266

VII. CONCLUSION
The Circuit Court properly applied the law to VidAngel’s case, and
preserved the protection that copyright law was created to bestow upon copyright owners and their creative works. VidAngel’s services infringed on
the Studios’ exclusive rights, and its circumvention of the access controls on
the works allowed VidAngel to copy and reproduce content that rightfully
belonged to the Studios. This type of filtering and streaming cannot be allowed to co-exist in contradiction to everything copyright law stands for.
The Copyright Act and the DMCA, as previously noted, do not only protect
industry giants like the Studios; they protect every artist, author, and contentproducer that strives to make a living and a career out of his or her own
expressive works. These works are extensions of their creators, and copyright law grants those creators the power to exercise control over how their
works are used, copied, and reproduced. It was the intention of copyright
law and the DMCA to shield owners from the very actions that VidAngel
sought to legitimize in this case. While VidAngel attempted to liken itself
to a harmless provider of cleaner content in response to a market demand for
family-friendly works, the reality is that its methods amounted to glorified
theft. Popular demand for a service or a good does not justify unlawful activity, and wholesome intentions do not absolve a thief of accountability.
Streaming services like VidAngel cannot be permitted to siphon a profit from
the creations and goodwill of others. If VidAngel intends to survive as a

266. Maddaus, Facing a Shutdown Order, supra note 219; see also Neal Harmon, VidAngel
Studios’ First Theatrical Release in Theaters Today, VIDANGEL, (Mar. 3, 2017), http://blog.vidangel.com/2017/03/03/vidangel-studios-first-theatrical-release-in-theaters-today/
[https://perma.cc/P3KJ-J2NH] (VidAngel Studios’ first theatrical release, “Tim Timmerman, Hope
of America,” hit theatres on March 3, 2017 as a PG-13 film); VIDANGEL, https://www.vidangel.com/ [https://perma.cc/773W-7USH] (VidAngel boasts “high quality original content” on its
website, listing Life on BitCoin, The Last Decent, The Ride, The Shepherd, Tim Timmerman, Hope
of America, My Brother the Time Traveler, and Dry Bar Comedy—”the worlds [sic] largest library
of clean comedy[,]”—as productions of VidAngel Studios).
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company, it needs to change its streaming service model or appeal to the
legislature for modification of filtering rights under copyright law.

